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Wyclif

on

Rights

StephenE. Lahey
In the study of medievalpolitical philosophythe tendencyhas been to pay
attentionto thinkerswho appearto have contributedto the birthof the modem.
While the value in coming to understandhow modem political thoughtdeveloped is undeniable,this tendencyis accompaniedby an implicit,perhapsunintentional,devaluationof the studyof thatwhich did not contributeas obviously
to modernity.In the historyof the idea of the naturalrightscholarshave distinguished betweenthe objective and the subjectiveright,characterizingthe subjective rightas what lies at the heartof the classically modem and liberal.One
could get the impressionthat the good political philosophers,having hit upon
the subjectiveright, dispensed with talk of the old-fashioned objective right
just as people abandonedgaslight when Edison's lightbulbwent on the market.' But this is not what happened;not only did objective rights discourse
continue into the modem period,but it was not necessarilythe idiom solely of
religious and political conservatives.
Some late medieval philosophers,notably Marsiliusof Padua,even came
with
up
progressive and unorthodoxpolitical visions while adhering to the
objectiveright.I will showthatat leastone latemedievalpoliticaltheoryfounded
on the objectiveright,thatof JohnWyclif, can be arguedto be as innovativein
several importantaspects as thatof any of the better-knownfourteenth-century
advocates of the subjectiveright. To do that, I will divide this paper into three
parts.In the first,I will explainthe differencebetween objectiveand subjective
theories of the right, making note of what we can reasonablyexpect from a
fourteenth-centurypolitical theory in the way of tolerationand briefly introducing JohnWyclifs life andworks. In the second I will recountWyclifs view
of ius, or the right, as it appearsin his political writings,and in the thirdI will
explain how this concept has a bearingon elements in his political thoughtthat
are recognizablyunorthodoxand even tolerantto modem, liberaleyes. Having

'See RichardTuck, NaturalRights Theories:TheirOrigin and Development(Cambridge,
1979), and Quentin Skinner,Foundationsof Modern Political Thought(Cambridge, 1978).
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shownhowWyclif'sobjectiverightplaysoutin his innovativeandreformative
politicalscheme,I hopeto havehelpedto dispelthe dogmathattheonlyearly
rightstheoriesworthstudyingarethosethatevolvedintooneswe use.
I.a.ObjectiveandSubjectiveRights
The explicitdistinctionbetweenobjectiveand subjectiverightsis a new
one, inventedby scholarsof thehistoryof politicalthoughtto distinguishbetweenthesenseof thetermius,orright,as thatwhichisjustin accordance
with
a set bodyof law,andthe senseof ius whichrefersto a licitpoweror faculty
withrightreason.2
Theobjectiveright
belongingto anindividualin accordance
in Romanlawandfunctioned
is grounded
inmedievallegalandpoliticalthought
as it hadin antiquity.
Generally,anindividualhada ius to actorbe actedupon
if thatactionwas commensurate
with the law.Amongthe Romans,thatlaw
was eitherRomanlaw,or it was accordingto objectivenaturallaw;withthe
of Christianmonotheism,
introduction
the ius was "right"accordingto God's
law.Tucknotesthatthe conceptof dominiumhadlong been of a piece with
hadusuallybeenseenas a speciesof
objectiveius andexplainsthatdominium
oversomething,it is becausetheir
objectiveius.If someonehasjustdominium
relationofdominiumis "(whatis) right,"ius,in accordwithjustice,iustitia.He
whichheunderstands
to mean"property,"
is equated
arguesthatwhendominium,
with ius, "right,"the foundationis laid for a possessive(subjective)right.3
Whilethisis problematic
on severalcounts,nottheleastof whichis therestrictionof dominiumto the ownershipof property,it illustratestherelatednessof
the two conceptsius anddominium.4
As juristicsophistication
grewin the twelfthcentury,it becameusefulto
distinguishbetweenius in re, "rightin a thing,"and ius ad rem,"rightto a
thing."If someonehas a ius in re, theycan use the thingand/orexercisedominiumoveritjustlywithoutansweringto anyone(saveGod).If someonehas
a ius ad rem,theyhavea claimto thething,buttheydo notexercisedominium
overit;theyrelyonthepresentdominusto fulfilltheirclaim.5Thisis notto say
thatius in re was seen as a "rightto dominium,for thejuristsheld thatdominiumwas a speciesof ius, allowingfor thereto be non-dominative
iurain
re."6

2

See Brian Tierey, "Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts and Contexts, 11501250," History of Political Thought, 10 (1989), 615-46, and "Marsiliuson Rights,"JHI, 52
(1991), 3-17.
3
Tuck, 3.
4
See Tierey, "Tuckon Rights: Some Medieval Problems,"History of Political Thought,
4 (1983), 429-41.
5 Tuck, 14-15.
6
See J. H. Bums, Lordship,Kingship,and Empire (Oxford, 1992).
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The subjectiveius is a differentmatter.In earlymodernitylegalphilosophersusuallydistinguishedthemfromobjectiverightsby referringto somethingwithinthe right-holder.
Tierneynotes thatGrotius(c. 1625) describes
objectiverightsin theusualfashion,"Thewordcouldmean'whatis just'(the
preferreddefinitionof Aquinas),or it couldmeana kindof law,andin that
senseiusnaturalewas a 'dictateof reason.'" Butsubjectiverightsweresomethingdifferent,"'a moralqualityof a personenablingoneto haveordo somethingjustly.' "7
Thisis somethinglikea faculty-includingpoweroveroneself-a liberty,
or a claimone couldmakeon otherthingsorpeople.A. S. McGradedefinesa
subjectiverightas "anindividual'slegallyrecognizedpoweror freedomwith
respectto some good."8Subjectiverightshadbegunto appearas earlyas the
twelfthcentury,althoughit was the laterthoughtof OckhamandGersonthat
provedto be directlyinfluentialto the earlymoder thinkers.9
Tierneyhas
notedthatwhileneitherGersonnorOckhamdescribeda twofolddefinitionof
ius as objectivelaw andsubjectiveright,Marsiliusdidmakesucha distinction
inhisdefinitioninDefensorPacisII.12.10.1Althoughthepurposeof Marsilius's
distinctionwasto arguethatanabsenceof subjectiverightswastheidentifying
markof trueChristianministry,thathe madethe distinctionis significant."
I.b."Progressive"
MedievalPoliticalThought?
A still-commonview is thatthe medievalviews of tolerationandprogressivitywere whatearlymoder, classicallyliberalthinkerswerereacting
against.If we definetolerationas willingnessto allowthecontinuedexistence
andde(if not flourishing)of waysof life differingfroma prevalentstandard
fineprogressivity
as a politicaltendencytowardstheeliminationof inequities
in thedistribution
of goodsorpower,so the storygoes, we areunlikelyto find
eitherin medievalvisionsof socialorder.Further,so long as the centralized,
hierarchical
of medievalpapalismmonopolized
structure
thesociety'sreligion,
7 Tierey

refers to Grotius,De lure Belli et Pacis (1989), I, 1.4, 2, 621-22.

8A. S. McGrade,
"Rights,NaturalRights,andthe Philosophyof Law,"in N. Kretzmann,
Jan Pinborg,A. Kenny (eds.), The CambridgeHistory of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cam-

bridge,1982),742, n.32.
9

See A. S. McGrade, The Political Thoughtof Williamof Ockham(Cambridge, 1974).

See also JanetColeman,"MedievalDiscussionsof Property:Ratioand Dominiumin ThirteenthandFourteenth-Century
PoliticalThoughtand Its Seventeenth-Century
Heirs,"Political Studies,33 (1985),73-100,andA. S. McGrade,"Aristotle's
Placein theHistoryof Natural
Rights,"Review of Metaphysics, 49 (1996), 803-29.
'0 Tierey, "Marsiliuson Rights,"5. See also Cary Nederman, Communityand Consent:
The Secular Political Theory of Marsiglio of Padua's Defensor Pacis (Lanham, Md., 1995),
34-35.
" See Defensor Pacis, II, 14.6-14; II 12.13; II.13.9-10.
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socialchangecouldonlytakeplacewiththe cooperationof priestsforwhom
tolerationor socialprogressivity
of
representeda threatto theirmaintenance
Reformation,
power.Oncethepapalstructure
beganto totterin the Protestant
the stagewas set fortheonsetof moder theoriesof toleranceof diversityand
forthe eventualdemiseof thefeudalclass structure.
A generationof scholarsof medievalpoliticaltheoryhaveunmaskedthis
fiction.12
Usuallythiscaseis madewiththinkerswho usedthesubjectivenaturalright,likeMarsiliusor Ockham,forwhomthe identification
of churchand
statewasto be avoided.A medievalsocialvisionfoundedon anobjectiveview
of rightcharacterized
by a similarlyunorthodoxrejectionof mechanismslike
feudalismandpriestlyhegemonywouldbe a noteworthyinstanceof moder
valuesturningup in medievalgarb.
Onthepoliticallevel,JohnWyclifadvocatestwo socialclasses-property
owners(includingthosewhousewhatothersown)andthosewholive in apostolic poverty,owningnothingprivately.He believesthe dutyof thejust civil
lordor king is to see thatthe apostolicallypoor,who areall membersof the
church,aresuppliedwith almsnecessaryfor acquiringthe goodstheyshare,
andto protecttheirpurepoverty.Theking'sdutyis alsoto ensurethatsociety's
civil ownerscan live harmoniously
togetherandwith the apostolicallypoor,
freefromanythreats.Theco-existenceof thesetwo classesundertheprotectionof thekingsuggestsan attitudeof tolerationtowardspropertyownership,
whichWyclifbelievesto be foundedin OriginalSin. Further,his doctrineof
Grace-founded
dominiumrequiresthe kingto serveas moralexemplarforhis
to
refrain
fromwarforanyreasonbutstrictlydefineddefenseof the
subjects,
realm,andto keepthe nation'slawsandtaxesto a bareminimum.Andgiven
thestillcommonsocialstrictures
of feudalism,Wyclif'sargument
thatno civil
dominium,includingbothpropertyownershipand civil jurisdiction,can be
establishedfeudalmachinery.
grantedin perpetuityoverturns
anti-authoritarian.
His attitudetowards
Wyclif'stheologyis remarkably
thestandingecclesiasticalhierarchy
is openlyhostile,andhe consistentlyholds
thatthe only clericalconcernsshouldbe the spiritualwelfareof the laity,that
interestin materialgainis evidenceof unsuitability
forthepriesthood.In late
resources,
fourteenth-century
Englandthechurchcontrolled
enoughland,natural
12

See also AnthonyBlack, "Societyand the Individualfrom the MiddleAges to Rousseau:
Philosophy,Jurisprudence,and ConstitutionalTheory,"History of Political Thought,1 (Summer, 1980), 145-66; JamesBlythe, Ideal Governmentand the Mixed Constitutionin the Middle
Ages (Princeton, 1992); Alan Gewirth, "Philosophy and Political Thought in the Fourteenth
Century,"TheForwardMovementof the FourteenthCentury(Columbus, 1961), 125-64; David
Luscombe, "The State of Nature and the Origin of the State," Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy; Brian Tierney,Religion, Law, and the Growthof ConsitutionalThought
1150-1650 (Cambridge, 1982). For premodem notions of toleration, see Cary Nedermanand
JohnC. Laursen,TheRoots of Tolerationin Europe, 1100-1700: Theoryand Practice (Lanham,
Md., 1997).
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andbarepoliticalpowerforWyclif'sview to be trulyincendiary.He also arshouldneverbe an optionfor controllingchurch
gues thatexcommunication
that
must
be availablefor clergyandlaityalike,andthat
members, Scripture
to the king,notthepope.
episcopalpowerbe subordinate
He
IsWyclif'stheoryastolerantasthebetterknownOckhamorMarsilius?
the
idea
that
the
consent
the
with
of
has
to
do
the
rejects
governed anything
andviewsa commujusticeof thegovernment,'3
speaksnotatall of parliament
of
a
aristocrats
as
bad
source
of
civil
nity
legislation,'4advocatessuffering
tyrannyas a kindof generaldivinepunishmentso long as the tyrantdoesnot
andmakesno bonesaboutthe churchbeinga sigundulyinjurethe church,15
nificantpartof the state.16On the face of it, fourteenth-century
advocatesof
natural
to
seem
deserve
the
for
of
subjective
right
praise separation churchand
state.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatan advocateof objectiverightlikeWyclifis
withoutinnovationsand in the thirdsectionof this paperwe will examine
elementsof secularand theologicalprogressivityin light of his conceptof
objectiveius.
I.c. JohnWyclif'sLife andWorks
HadWyclifremained
wherehe was in 1373,historywouldremember
him
as amongthe last of the Oxfordschoolmen,a Masterof Balliolcollege and
oneof themostarticulateopponentsof theModerniconceptuphilosophically
alistontology.17
of 1368-69
Indeed,therecenteditionof his De Universalibus
revealsa satisfyinglysophisticated
in
realism.18
But
1374
philosophical
Wyclif
decidedthatit was time to turnfromtheoreticalpursuits,andhe beganhis
This Summa
politicallyand ecclesiasticallyreformativeSummaTheologie.'9
wasto launcha firestormof controversy,
initiallyinvolvingGregoryXI,Urban
and
John
of
Gaunt
over
fierce
whichcameto a
VI,
Wyclifs
anti-papalism,
headin controversial
trialsandeventuallyled to thehereticalLollard.
Ourinterestlies in the firstbooksof the Summa,whereWyclifdescribes
the relationof God to creation,the Fall, and the optimumconditionsfor
'3 De Civili Dominio [henceforth,DCD], I, xviii, p. 130. 6-14.
14
Ibid., I, xxviii.
15

Ibid., I, vi, 43; xxviii; De Officio Regis [henceforth,DOR], i, ii, iii, 52, viii, 201.

16DCD, I, xxviii; DOR, ii, vii.
17See H. B. Workman'sJohn Wyclif:A Studyof the English Church(Oxford, 1926). See

also J.A. Robson, Wyclifandthe OxfordSchools (Cambridge,1966); Anne HudsonandMichael
Wilks (eds.), From Ockhamto Wyclif:Studies in ChurchHistory,Subsidia, 5 (London, 1987);
and William J. Courtenay,Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-CenturyEngland (Princeton,
1987).
18John Wyclif, Tractatusde Universalibus,ed. Ivan J. Mueller (Oxford, 1985); On Universals, tr. Anthony Kenny (Oxford, 1985).
'9 De Dominio Divino [henceforth, DD], I, incipit, 1.6: "[T]empus mihi per totum residuumvite mee tam speculativequampractice,secundummensuramquam Deus donaverit...."
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humans.InDe DominioDivinoWyclifcharacterizes
therelation
postlapsarian
of Godto creationin termsof dominium,a portmanteau
wordwhichincorporatesthe conceptsof ownershipandjurisdiction.20
WyclifexplainsthatGod's
dominiumis the first,unmediated
causeof all instancesof createddominium
as paradigmatic
anddescribesdivinedominium
in its nutritivelove(caritas)of
He furtherdefinesGod'sdominiumas involvingthe truestkind
its subjects.21
of ownership;humanswho havebeengivendominiumin creationcannotlay
claimto sucha perfectrelation.22
Wyclif explores human dominiumin De Statu Innocencie (1376), which

in Eden,andinDe Civili
givesa pictureof theidyllicnaturalhumandominium
is
Dominio(1376-77),whichexplainshowjustpostlapsarian
humandominium
In
both
on
contends
that
all
human
dominium
is
loan
possible.
Wyclif
really
fromGod andthattruehumanlordsexercisethis relationin andthrougha
wills.23
Grace-givencaritasotherwiseimpossibleforpostlapsarian
WyclifbelievesthatGraceis absolutelynecessaryfor humanlordsto be
just;withoutit the civil lordwouldbecomeenmeshedin the worriesconsequenton ownership,inevitablylapsingintotyranny.Becausea lord'sjurisdictive authorityis only possiblethroughGrace,it followsthathumanjusticeis
YetWyclif believes
only possiblewhencivil law is groundedin divinelaw.24
to
an
be
that
founded
and anyinstitution
privateproperty
abomination,
ownership
Thedominiumwithwhich
uponit cannotpossiblypartakeof God'sjustice.25
humanswerecreatedinvolvedno"mine"and"thine"andwastherelationmeant
to allowhumanparticipation
in God'slovingdominiumovercreation.26
Since
this naturaldominiumwas lost with the Fall,Wyclifmighthavearguedthat
civil dominiumcan admitof Graceas a kindof substituefor the lost ideal.
thattheEdenicnatural
canberegained
dominium
Rather,
Wyclifbelieves
through
Christ'sredemptionof OriginalSin, andthatall thosefavoredby Graceare
freedfromthe anxietiesof privateownership.27
TheseGrace-favored
natural
lords,he explains,arethetruemembersof the church,anddeserveto be protectedfromthehazardsofpost-lapsarian
life by someonesufficientlypowerful
to overcomeanythreat.

20 For datingWyclifs writings,see Williel R. Thomson, TheLatin
WritingsofJohn Wyclyf
(Toronto, 1983).
21
DD, I, iii-vi.
22
Ibid., I, ii, 11.24ff.; I, x, 65.13-75.32.
23 De
Statu Innocencie, vi; DCD, I, iv; III, xv.
24
DCD, I, i, 1.1-3:"Iusdivinumpresupponituriuricivili; Dominiumnaturalepresupponitur
dominio civili" See also Michael Wilks, "Predestination,Property,and Power:Wyclif's Theory
of Dominion and Grace,"Studies in ChurchHistory, II (London, 1965), 220-36.
25
DCD, I, xxii, 155.17.
26
DD, I, iii; De Statu Innocencie, vi; DCD, III, xiii.
27
DCD, I, ix; III, i-xiii.
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Thisis theplaceof theGrace-favored
civillord;he is qualifiedby Graceto
of civil
enjoyrestorednaturaldominiumbutmustshoulderthe responsibility
dominium
on behalfof his fellows.28
civil lordis necesThus,a Grace-favored
the
for
of
the
is
enabled
to recognizethat
church
and
Grace
sary
protection
by
his officeis reallyone of stewardship
on behalfof thedivinelordandnottruly
jurisdictiveownership.29
The churchmustsubmitto the Grace-favored
civil lord'sregulationas a
a
submits
to
When
the
patient
physician.
patientstruggles,thephysiciandoes
not quailbut ratherpersistseven if the patientbelievesthe physicianto be
Thecivil lordmustserveas materialvicarin the church,
engagedin murder.30
withfull temporalpowersoverthe kingdom.Thisamountsto a completedivestmentof all of the church'smaterialholdings,whichwouldbe disastrous
werethe civil lordnot alwaysconsciousthathe is only God'ssteward.31
As mentioned,the outcomeof this reformative
for societyis
prescription
two classes:the property-holding
majority,includingall who implicitlyshow
theirapprovalof proprietasthroughtheiruse of privateproperty,and the
apostolicallypoorminority,who relyon thekingfortheirmaterialneeds.The
property-holding
majorityarenotmembersof Christ'sbodyon earthby virtue
of theirwillingnessto ownproperty,andaredamned,whilethe apostolically
poorminorityarethosewhomGod foreknowsto be saved.The civil lordor
kingis of thislattergroupandservesas the kingdom'sshepherdandsteward,
caringforthesavedandthedamnedalike.Thisis thegeneraloutlineofWyclifs
socialvision,fromwhichflowshisrejectionof thefeudalorder,hiscondemnationof church-owned
privateproperty,andall thatwe will discussbelow.32
II.Wyclifon Rights
Whilethe idealrelationof ChurchandStatein De CiviliDominiois describedin termsof Grace-founded
the idea'srootslie in therights
dominium,
outlined
inDe
Mandatis
Divinis.WillielR.Thomson
theoryWyclifhadalready
datesthetreatise,thefirstinWyclif'sSummaTheologie,at 1375orearly1376.
HereWyclifset outto showhumanshowto realizeGod'swill fortheiractions,
of ius and iustitiaas it is knowableby hubeginningwith a consideration
28

Ibid., I, xvii; xviii, 129; xxxviii, 265.29-266.4; see also DOR, x.
DD, III, vi; DCD, I, xi; I, xxxvi; See also A.S. McGrade,"SomersaultingSovereignty:
a Note on ReciprocalLordshipand Servitudein Wyclif,"in Diana Wood (ed.), The Churchand
Sovereignty,Studies in ChurchHistory, Subsidia, 9 (London, 1991), 261-68.
30 DCD, I, xxxvii, 272-74.
31 DCD, I, xi, 75; xxxiii, 231; xxxvi, 259; DOR, iv, 79.
32 Wyclif can be construedas
allowing for the righteousnessof other propertyowners in
DCD, III, vii-viii, where he argues that one's poverty in spirit is more importantthan one's
poverty in ownership.
29
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mans.33
HoldingthatHoly Scripturesarethe mostdirectsourceof God'swill
forhumanaction,hedirectsmostof thetreatiseto anexegesisof theDecalogue.34
of whythenatureof the
My attentionwill be focusedon Wyclifs explanation
in
is
found
and
what
its
are
right
Scripture
implications forhis rightslanguage.
At theoutsetofDe MandatisDivinisWyclifexplainsthatiusis a termused
whensomethingis just.35To showthatiustitiais an effectof beingin accord
withius,Wyclifsuggestswe lookat thethreesensesof thetermius.First,it is
usedto describeanyrealcreatednaturejustlyexercisedovera subject(servum),
Second,it is used to describethe
includingthe use of something/someone.
to
of
a
lord
use
power
(a rightof use).Finally,it is usedto
something/someone
referto the uncreatedtruthparadigmatic
for all iustitia,"whichsomecall the
artof the fairandthe good, andsome a holy sanction,whichcommandsthe
uprightandforbidsthe opposite,butsomemorecompletelysaythatius is the
constantandperpetualwill grantingto eachwhatis theirown."36
Somehaveusedthis lastdefinitionof iustitia,butincorrectly.
Weshould
that
iustitia
an
is
effect
of
for
the
ius,
recognize
only thingpriorto iustitia
accordingto thejurist'sdefinitionis theconstantwill to giveto everyonetheir
due.Canthisconstantwill be anythingotherthanius?HereWyclifis extrapoInstitutes,whereinthefirstsentencetheemperorbegins
latingfromJustinian's
withthe workingRomandefinitionof iustitiajust given.37PerhapsWyclifis
reasoningthat if creatediustitiais foundedin a constanthumanwill, the
uncreated
andpurerdivineiustitiamustbe foundedin thedivinewill.If so and
if onereadsJustinian's
definition"constans
etperpetua
voluntasiussuumcuique
tribuens"
as presupposing
a ius whichis eachperson'sdue,it seemsnaturalto
concludethatGodknowsas he wills whatis eachperson'sdue,whichwould
makewhatis ius at leastcontemporaneous
with divinewillingandcertainly
priorto the iustitiaconsequenton perfectwilling.
Iustitia,Wyclifexplains,is usuallydefinedas a moralvirtue,a habit;and
becausethe divinewill is not a habitbuta personof the Trinity,ius mustbe
Thisis not to say thatWyclifembracesthe
priorto andcausativeof iustitia.38
Aristoteliandefinitionof iustitiabutratherthattheAristotelians
arewrongto

De Mandatis Divinis (henceforth,DMD), I, 1.1-7.
III, 21.13-25.
35 DMD, I, 8-10.
36 Ibid., 1.13-2.6: "Et tercio accipitur ius pro veritate increataomnem creatamiusticiam
exemplante;quamquidamvocant artemequi et boni; et quidamdicuntquod est sanccio sancta,
precipienshonesta et prohibenscontraria;sed quidamdicunt complecius quod ius est constans
et perpetuavoluntas tribuensunicuique quod est suum."
37Justinian,Corpusluris Civilis, Vol.I,Institutiones, I.i. 1: "Iustitiaest constanset perpetua
voluntaius suum cuique tribuens.Iurisprudentiaest divinarumatquehumanarumrerumnotitia,
iusti atque iniusti scientia."
33

34 DMD,

38

Ibid., 2.7-16.
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supposethattheirversionof iustitiacouldpossiblybe directiveof uncreated
ius.

All createdjusticeis a virtueof a rationalcreature,butno creature
subjectsanyotherthroughpowerto give up his right,so thisdescription does not matchcreatedjustice;indeed,if anyjusticematches,it
wouldbe uncreated
justice,in whichcoincideright,thejust,andpure
is
justice.This,then, the order:the virtueof justiceis foundedin the
rationalcreatureby right,whichis the simplestandfirstrule,which
right is just formaliter. And by ... [this objective right] the works of

humansarejust, thusa humanworkis just by justice,as justice [is
just] by right.39
Onemightwonderwhy,if in Godthejust,the right,andjusticeareidentical, createdjusticewouldbe causallydependenton the uncreatedright.Why
noton uncreated
justice?Wyclifhasmadeit clearthatall thatisjustin creation
happensbecauseGodwills it.40Whilewhathappensis just,thatit happensis
right.SinceGodknowsandwills thatit happen,whichknowingandwillingis
the uncreated"right,"
the actingthatis takingplaceis just butthatthe action
occuris right.41
It is not surprisingthatWyclifmakesthe argumentthatall createdstandardsof the rightare as nothingin comparisonto uncreatedright,givenhis
dominiuminDe DominioDivino.What
descriptionof God'sall-encompassing
is remarkable
is his referenceto ius as thejustexerciseof authority
overoruse
of something/someone
andalso as the powerof dominiumor use. This sugin
one
case
a
diversion
fromthe objectiverightas it appearsin Aquinas
gests
andin theothera potentialsensitivityto theideaof the subjectiveius,whichis
describedby Marsiliusas an act,poweror habit.42
Canwe notexplainbothof thesereferencesas to traditional
objectiveius?
the
first
a
created
truth
exercised
over
a
sense,
Regarding
subject,one
justly
couldmaketheargument
thatthisis in accordwithAquinas'sdescription
of ius
or iustumas "commensurate
with anotherpersonaccordingto some senseof

39

Ibid., 2.17-3.2: "Item, omnis creata iusticia est virtus creatureracionalis, sed nullius

creaturepotestatisubiacetunicuiqueius suumtribuere;ergo dictadescripcionon competit
createiusticie;immosi alicuiiusticieconveniat,hoc erit iusticieincreate,in quaius, iustum
et perconsequnsdictadescripcioiuriprimoconvenit.Isteergo
atqueiusticiamerecoincidunt;
eritordo:a iure,quodest simplicissimaac primaregula,infunditur
creatureracionalivirtus
Et ab hiis simuldiciturdenominacione
extrinsecaopus
iusticie,qua ipsaest iustaformaliter.
hominisesse iustum,sic quodopushumanumfit iustuma iusticia,sicutiusticiafit a iure."
40
41
42

DD, I, x, 74.5ff.
DMD,I, 4.15-5.2.Cf. ThomasAquinas,SummaTheologiae,IIaIIae,57.1.

See DefensorPacis,11.12,10;see also Tierney,"Marsiliuson Rights,"5.
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But we should be clear about what sort of"created truth"is being
fairness."43

justlyexercised;the use of the termservumsuggestsdominium.
Aquinasdescribesthe dominiumrelationas beinga specialsortof ius, like the parental
ius.He saysthatthedominativeius detractsfromtheius andiustumof thelord
andthe servant.
A childpreciselyas such belongsto the father,anda slaveprecisely as suchbelongsto the master.All the same,each,takenas an
individualhumanbeing,subsistsin himselfanddistinctfromothers.
Eachaccordinglyis an objectof justicein somemanner,inasmuchas
eachis a humanbeing.Accordingly,lawsarelaiddownregulating
the
of
father
andchild,andof masterandslave.Butto theextent
dealings
thateachbelongsto anotherthe full character
of therightandthejust
is lacking.44
The only way to claimthatWyclifs firstdescriptionof ius is in referenceto
Aquinas'sdefinitionof objectiverightwouldbe to holdthatWyclifsawius as
of Aquinas'stheory.Betterto interexclusivelydominative,a bastardization
pretthisfirstdescriptionas a stateof affairsbetweentheholderandthat/those
overwhichthe relationis held thathas its "rightness"
by virtueof its being
exercisedjustly.Wyclif'sreferencetojusticeas a habitcouldcorrespond
to this
were
someone
to
ask
how
the
relation
could
be
exercised
description;
justly,
theresponsewouldbe thattheius camefromthepracticeof themoralvirtueof
justiceon thepartof the holder.
ButWyclifhasalreadyarguedthatjusticeis foundednotin somecreated
or artificialsystemof thoughtbutin the perfectjusticeof uncreatedius. The
referenceto justiceas a habitis not his finalwordon thetopic;in factWyclif
believessucha description
to be inadequate
in referenceto truejustice.So his
firstdescription
is of a rationallyformulable
createdstateof affairscommensuratewith the ius of God'swill. Briefly,whatis trulyrightor just in human
affairsdependson whatis divinelyrightorjust. Beyondthat,Wyclifs intentionis hardto discern.
Theseconddescriptionis quitedifferentfromthefirst;in thiscase ius is a
lord'spowerto use. This appearsto correspondto the Marsiliansubjective
rightas beinga powerheldby an individualandis evocativeof thedefinitions
43 Summa Theologicae, IIaIIae,57,

2.

44Ibid., 57, 4: "Ad secundumdicendum quod filius, inquantumfilius est aliquid patris;et

similiter servus, inquantumservus est sliquid domini; uterque tamen, prout consideraturut
quidamhomo, est aliquidsecundumse subsistensab aliis distinctum.Et ideo inquantumuterque
est homo, aliquo modo ad eos est justitia; et propterhoc etiam aliquae leges danturde his quae
sunt patris ad filium, vel domini ad servum; sed inquantumuterqueest aliquid alterius, secundum hoc deficit ibi perfecta ratiojusti vel juris."
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whichTierey reportsof the canonists.45
In this case individualsholdingdominiumcanchooseto use thatoverwhichtheyexercisedominium.
Thereare
no strictures:
Wyclifdoes not add,"accordingto the establishedlaws of use
such
nordoes he say "inaccordancewithGod'swill."
dominium,"
regulating
Buthe does restrictit to peoplewho arelords,whichis no longera universal
condition,given the Fall. Wyclifbelievedthathumanswere createdwith a
naturaldominium,a non-proprietative
relationin which everyonecoulduse
whattheyneededof creation;buttheFalleffectivelyendedthisstate.46
Sinceanyonemightbe a lordwithGrace,however,we cannotbe satisfied
thatthis is evidenceforthe absenceof a subjectiveright.Fornowit is enough
to notehowthe seconddescriptionof ius implicitlyrefersto propertyownerandthatthisdescriptioncouldconceivablybe
ship,orproprietasin dominium,
understood
as a kindof subjective
right.SinceAdam'sfallwhathasbeenneeded
to havethispowerhasbeenGrace;andsinceWyclifdevotesmuchmoreattentionto Graceas theprimaryfoundation
fordominium,
we cannotconcludethat
he has erectedhis dominiumtheoryon the basisof subjectiverights.
Christ'sredemptionallowedfor the reintroduction
of naturaldominium
intotheworld,butonlytheGrace-favored
cannowclaimit.47Wyclifidentifies
this class withthe Christianchurchandarguesthatthe clergy'spropensityto
Natural
privateownershiphas done greatviolenceto Christ'sredemption.48
dominiumis recoverablein apostolicpoverty,and the Churchmustrecover
itself therein.49
The only peoplecapableof divestingthe Churchof wealth
withoutincurring
blamearetheGrace-favored,
thosewhomthedivinewill has
ordainedmustact as the Church'sstewards.Butif the Grace-favored
are,as a
class,naturallordswho shouldbe freeof privateownership,Wyclifappearsat
crosspurposes-who else is qualifiedto act?
Wyclif'sargumentsin favorof the idea thatsome of the Grace-favored
naturallordsmustset asidetheirrestoredbirthright
to takeon the burdenof
civil dominiumandreformthe Church,while comprehensible
in termsof his
of
exceed
the
of
this
discussion.
For
now
it is enoughto
description ius,
scope
notethatthe seconddescriptionof ius implicitlyrefersto propertyownership,
ortheproprietasindominium,
andthatthisdescription
couldconceivablyhave
been classifiableas a subjectiveright,hadAdamnot sinned.Wycliftakesno
notice of this possibility in De MandatisDivinis nor in De StatuInnocencieor

De CiviliDominio,indicatingthathe eitherhadnotknownof subjectiverights,
or thathe was indifferentto them.

45 See Tiemey, "Originsof NaturalRights
Language,"629-38.
46See esp. De Statu Innocencie, III, 491.15-18.
47 DCD, I, ix, 62.9-13.
48DCD, III, i-xi.
49 Ibid., xiii.
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Thenextstepis to explainhowproperlyto use thetermius,whichhe does
in chapter3 of De MandatisDivinis.Herehe takesthe distinctionbetween
uncreatedandcreatedrightof chapter1 andprovidesthebasisforthedoctrine
dominiumby showingall conceptionsof createdrightto be
of Grace-founded
relianton uncreated
right.He beginsby makinguse of thedistinctionbetween
iusin re andiusad rem,assertingthecanonists'dictumthat"itis impossibleto
All rational
havea rightto a thingunlessyou alreadyhavea rightin a thing."50
creaturescan only have thingsby rightandtitle throughGod'swilling,the
mostpowerfulright."Ifthe givingof a temporallordmakesthereceiverhave
theright[tothegift]fromthegiver,howmuchgreateris thegivingof theLord
of lords...."51

Thisremarkabouta lord'sgivingis a referenceto Wyclifs discussionof
the directiveforceof God'sgivingandof its necessityfor all createdacts of
givingin De DominioIII,chapters1 and2.52God'sactof givingtakesnothing
fromHis owndominiumandis the only meansby whichanycreatedbeingis
ableto haveexistence.If this is the case with existence,it mustbe with any
overanother;so
righta createdbeingmighthaveto use or exercisedominium
in orderfor someoneto havea rightto use or dominium,
theymustfirsthave
beengiventhisuse ordominiumby God.Wycliflikensthisrelianceof human
use anddominium
uponthe divinegivingto the relationof stewardto master.
fromhis lordtheproper
"Justas thestewardof a temporallordwhodistributes
ofdominium
does
not
but
them
of
himself, dispensesthem[onbehalf
gifts
give
of his master],so it is withthe givingof anycreature."53
Thisreferenceallowshim to distinguishius fromdominiumby claiming
thatius causallyprecedesdominium;one cannothavedominiumover somethingwithoutfirsthavinga ius in re. Whatof the possibilitythatthis would
precludeanycreaturefromeitheracquiringordestroyingtheirright,sincetheir
havingtherightis eternallyestablishedin thedivinewill?Wyclifassumesthat
his readersarefamiliarwith his discussionof the non-deterministic
natureof
God's perfect knowing in De Dominio Divino, I, chapters 14-19.54 There, his

distinctionbetweenabsolutenecessity,truthswhichcannotnotbe andnecessity ex suppositione,truthshavingan eternalcausefromwhichtheirtemporal
beingflowsformally,allowsWyclifto holdthatGod'sknowingandwillingis
50

DMD, III, 15.20-23: "[I]mpossibileest tamen aliquem habereius ad rem, nisi habuerit
ius in re pro suo temporeet econtra."
51Ibid., 16.1-3 "Si enim donacio domini temporalisfacit ius donatorioad donatum,quanto
magis donacio domini dominorum...."
52 See
esp. DD, III, I, 199.19.
53
Ibid., III, I, 206.7: "Sicut ergo dispensatorterrenidominii manualitertradendodominia
domini donantisproprienon donatea tam proprie,sed dispensat;sic est de donacionecuiuslibet
creature."
54 Ibid., I, xiv-xix, 115-72.
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necessaryex suppositioneand so not fatallydeterministic.5So WyclifconcludesthatpeoplecandeservethroughGracejustuseof possessions,andpower
to thatuse,bothof whichdifferfromdominium.56
NotthatWyclifis suggesting
thatpeoplecannotdeservedominium
his desireis to showhow
Grace;
through
ius anddominiumare distinct,andherehe has shownthatpeoplecan merit
non-dominative
rightsto thingsthroughGod's havinggiven themrightsin
things.
He notesthathe hasmadeuse of threesensesof thetermius in thecontext
of this discussion.
Threekindsof rightare ordainedessentially:the rightwhichis
divinewilling,the rightwhichis the poweroverthe usable,andthe
rightwhichis theuse.Thesecondof thesecannotexistunlessthefirst
precedesit eternally,norcanthethirdexistunlessthesecondprecedes
it in timeor in nature.57
Thisis a reordering
of thethreesensesof ius;nowthatwe areclearabouttheir
he
applicability, appearsto be saying,we can arrangethemproperly.Here
betweentheabilityto use orforbearfromusinganobject
Wyclifdistinguishes
andtheactualuse of theobjectin referringto therightwhichis thepowerover
the usableandthe rightwhichis the use. It is not likelythatWyclifhadthis
distinctionin mindwhenhe listedthe uses of ius in Chapter1, forbothof the
firsttwo sensesin the firstdescriptionareformulatedto allowdistinguishing
betweenpotentialandactualuse. Still,thesecondsensein theearlierlistlooks
like "poweroverthe usable,"and"use"in this sectionmightconceivablybe
whatWyclifhadin mindby "justlyexercisingtruth."
At thispointWyclifrefersto anysortof ius thatis noteitheruncreated
ius
in re or ius ad remas merepretenses,andhe comparesthesesupposedhuman
rightsto true,uncreatedrightsas analogousto the differencebetweenpossessionof somethingbydominium
andpossessionby use.Itis easyto saythatone
possessessomethingwithoutbeingspecificas to whatgroundsallowthepossession.Onecanjustlypointto a thingandsay,"Thatis mine!"withoutanyone
askingwhetherthe speakeris owningor renting(enjoyingthe use of) it. But
suchcustomarylinguisticusageobscuresthe natureof things.If someonehas
55Ibid.,
115-25; also Tractatusde Universalibus, xiv, 54ff. See also Anthony Kenny,

"RealismandDeterminism
in EarlyWyclif,"ed. AnneHudson,Studiesin ChurchHistory,5
(Oxford,1987), 165-78.
56

DMD, iii, p.16.20-24.

Ibid.,16.24-28:"Pateteciamquodistatriaiuraessencialiterordinatasunt;ius quodest
volicio divina,ius quodest potestasad usibile,et ius quodest usus;sic quodsecundumnon
potest esse, nisi primumeternaliterprecesserit,nec terciumpotest esse, nisi secundum
precesserittemporevel natura."
57
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the rightto a thing,he has it becauseGod wills it, whichcannotbe controhe cannotgive it
verted;likewise,if someonepossessesa thingby dominium,
up or haveit rightfullytakenaway.58
all humanlegislationandjurisdiction
mustbe conductedby
Consequently,
who relyon huof uncreatedius. Philosophers
peoplewithan understanding
manreasonunguidedby Scripturecannotbe expectedto pointto just society,
andwhen scriptural
guidanceis abandoned,iniquityis the only possibleresult.59Thoselegislatorswho striveto incorporate
God'swill in theirworkrequireGracebecauseGodmustwill thattheysucceedbeforetheydo.Fromhere
Wyclif'sanalysisofjust humanjurisdictionin De CiviliDominioandDe Officio Regis begins.

Havingshownthe causalnecessityof uncreatediuraforjust law-making,
we shouldconsiderwhetherWyclifmeansthatjust legislatorscancreatelaws
thatwouldthemselvesestablishjustcreated(objective)iura.Thatis, if uncreated
to legislatejustly,dothecreatedobjective
rightis necessaryforthelaw-makers
that
result
from
their
rights
legislationhave any claimto thejustice of that
legislation?Giventhatcreatedrightsbasedin humanlegislationunfoundedin
Scripturecannotbejust, cananycreatedrightbe just?6
So longas createdius is regulatedaccordingto uncreated
ius it is just,and
an expressionof the divinewill. But if the necessaryconditionforjusticein
createdius is foundedin uncreatedius,who is capableof establishingwhether
a givencreatediusis so founded?As alreadyindicated,onlytheGrace-favored
canare,whichsuggeststhata legislator'ssubjectswho arenotGrace-favored
notrealizethejusticeof theirlegislator'sactions.So government
consensus
by
wouldbe foreignto Wyclif.61But it wouldalso suggestthatanybodywho is
Grace-favored
couldassessthe qualityof the ruler'slegislation.Wyclifwould
not denythis butarguesinsteadthatthe Grace-favored
shouldbe concerned
morewithspiritualperfectionthanwiththemundaneconcernsof civil legislation.62Thusthe Grace-favored
legislatorwouldbe takingon a grievouslyopburden
a
pressive
by becoming civil lord.This sacrificereflectsthe servile
natureof civil dominium,forthe Grace-favored
civil lordis reallythe steward
of the divineLord,as the ius resultantfromhis legislationis reallya created
in uncreatedius.
participation
notes
thatcreatedius hasprovento be divisibleby thosenotaware
Wyclif
of thepriorityof uncreated
ius,andhe endshis discussionof rightswitha brief
of
these
divisions.
This summaryis in concertwith the medieval
summary
Aristoteliandivisionof createdcivil power,andthe unwaryreadermightpre58

Ibid., 18.1-16.
59Ibid., 22.1.
60
Ibid., 23.5.
61
DCD, I, xviii, 130.6-14.
62
DOR, VI, 133.16-30.
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sume Wyclif to be groundedin Aristotle. This is easily dispelled by recalling
Wyclif's belief that the Aristotelianview of justice as moral virtue does not
sufficiently account for the directivepower of uncreatedius.
One can explain createdius in two ways, he begins;the first is by dividing
of ius accordingto the differentnations in which they appear.Some
sorts
up
rightsare Roman,while othersare English. But this confusionof variationand
contrastis of no use to theorists.63Better is a descriptionbased in the rhythms
of created nature.At its most basic, created ius governs the proliferationand
structuraldevelopmentof everythingin creation.Among humans,this underlying ius is called ius gentium,whereby all agree that it is right for people to
live virtuously,to marryfor procreation,and to live socially to maximize the
rationallycomprehensibleorder.64
Less generally defined is the final species of createdius, wherebyhuman
reasonregulatessocieties in conformitywith the primaryrightcalled domestic,
civil or political right. In some cases, he notes, its ideal developmentis aristocracy,while among othersit is democracy,"accordingto the virtues,the riches,
or according to political nobility or the election of the people...."65Philosophers can divide the political laws that come from these varying methods of
rule as being common and public, or private laws. Of these divisions Wyclif
has nothing more to say, referringhis readerto the third book of Aristotle's
Politics.
We have alreadyseen how Wyclif rejectsAristotle's lack of foundationin
uncreatedius, and so need only note this description'sassumptionof reliance
of such an arrangementupon the uncreatedius of God's will. Wyclif makesno
significantuse of this potentialdevelopmentof ius into aristocracyor democracy in any later works, framinghis descriptionof just humangovernmentin
monarchictermswithoutreferenceto constitutionsorganizedaccordingto the
needs of the governed. Why, then, this reference to the types of government
describedin the Politics? It is possible that he had not yet developed his monarchismwhen he wrote De MandatisDivinis, but it is more likely that he felt
the need to avoid framingthe discussion of the decaloguethatwas to follow in
exclusively monarchistterms, given the relatively late developmentof kingship in the history of Israel.
Wyclif's view of rights,then, is of a created,objectiverightwholly reliant
upon the ius of divine will; an individualhas a ius to usus or dominiumif and
only if God wills that the individualhave it. Artificed systems of the assignment of rightsnot foundedin God's will as revealedin Scriptureare fictions in
which true ius appears only accidentally.His formulationof this position is
63

DMD, III, 23.23-27.

64

Ibid., 24.1-17.

65

Ibid., 11.20-23.
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sufficientlycomplexas to admitof a distinctionbetweenius in re andius ad
remandto holdits own in contrastwitha moreconventional
framework.
III.Toleration
in Wyclif'sPoliticalThought
coexistenceof privatepropertyowners
Wyclif'svisionof the harmonious
withtheapostolicallypoorindicatesa willingnessto toleratethe institutionof
privatepropertyownership,despiteit's rootsin humansin. Thisalonecanbe
in Wyclif'sapproach,since,unlike
arguedto indicatea vein of progressivity
his
of
who
many
contemporaries acceptedAristotle'sview of privateproperty
as naturalandrational,he feltit to be neithernaturalnorrational.Severalideas
follow fromthis thatsuggesta kinshipwith latersocial reformmovements.
theGrace-favored
thatcharacterizes
Amongtheseare,first,themoralrestraint
civil lord'srule;second,Wyclif'srejectionof biologicalhereditary
succession
as a meansby whichdominium
(civilownershipandrule)is conferreduponthe
civillord;third,his beliefthata lord'ssubjectsoughtto be freeto reprovetheir
lord;andfinally,Wyclif'sdistrustof excessiverelianceon a multitudeof laws,
courts,andlawyers.
An acceptanceof civil ownershipuponwhichthe secularstateis erected
indicatesWyclif'sreadinessto providefor the ugly realitiesof postlapsarian
life. Not onlyoughtthe Grace-favored
civil lordavoidharmingpropertyowncounsels
the
civil
lord
to
ers,Wyclif
protectandnourishthe commonwealth.
Thisprotectionmightinvolveseveremeasures;when invasionthreatensthe
well-beingof the kingdom,for example,the king oughtdo whathe can to
or churchesto
cathedrals
protectall citizens,evenif thisinvolvesdismantling
use the stonesfor battlements.66
To insurea healthyeconomyandthe likelihood of fair financialtransactions,the king shouldregulatethe kingdom's
merchantsto preventescalationof interestrates.67
the king'sregulaFurther,
tion mustpreventthe lesser propertyownersand non-apostolicusersfrom
forfailureto reindigencyandprotectdebtorsfromunreasonable
punishment
paybecauseof fire,shipwreck,or robbery.68
Themoralpurityof the Grace-favored
civil lordis embodiedin the lord's
caritas,whichis expressedas loveforhis subjects;theselfishnessof thedomiA chiefcharacteristic
of this
neeringowneris foreigntojust civil dominium.69
caritas is the tendency for the civil lord to act towardshis subjects as if they

werehis mastersandto governaccordingto the needsof the governed,not

66
67
68
69

DOR, viii, 185.9-21.
DCD, III, xvi, 311-313.
DOR, v, 96.16-27; De Ecclesia, xi, 243.11-21.
DCD, I, xxiii, 227-231; xxxvi, 259.
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those of the governor.70Grace will allow the civil lord to serve as a moral
exemplar for his kingdom, a standardaccordingto which the subjects ought
model their own actions.71So long as the king's life is exemplary,Wyclif believes, the subjectswill know that they are being ruled by the Grace-favored,
and will be inclined to live in imitationof their lord;but should the king serve
as a model of depravity,the entire kingdommust surely be mired in depravity
as well.72
Chief among the means by which a kingdomdeterioratesis the institution
of hereditarysuccession. God can never countenancethe inheritanceof civil
ownershipbecause the concept of Grace-favoreddominiumrequiresthat civil
owners merit their office throughpurityof will. This line of argumentis particularly remarkablegiven its fourteenth-centurycontext. Wyclif argues not
only thatmonarchyshould find a non-dynasticway to pass on its responsibilities, but also that there should be an end to perpetualgrants,throughwhich a
king rewardsa favoredservantwith a gift of land or service to be passed on to
the servant'schildrenin perpetuity,and of hereditaryservitude,wherea slave's
childrenare themselves forced into slavery.73What this amountsto is a rejection of the feudal apparatusthat had come to characterizemedievalEngland.
How to providefor the rightpersonbeing madeking, if not throughdynastic inheritance?Certainly not through popular elections, Wyclif argues, because the sins of the electors are likely to affect the outcome of the election,
despite the best of intentions.Neither inheritancenor election are reliable,because for every Solomon who has inheritedhis thronethere is a Nero, and for
every Lincoln who has been popularlyelected there has been a Hitler."Thus
since acquiringthe title itself does not suffice, but clearly needs a title of charity superadded,it is clear also that neither hereditarysuccession nor popular
election suffice in themselves either."74
Better to be more careful about the relation of filiation, for the problem
with inheritanceis thatone's naturalson might not be Grace-favored.Filiation
through instructionin Christ is more likely to provide the propermeans by
which an appropriateheir to the kingship may be selected. "The title of dominiumby law of heredity in Christ is naturallymore prior and continually
more requisiteafterthe Fall than any othermode of dominium."75
If the heir to
70

Ibid., I, xxxiv, 243.13-33.
Ibid., I, xx; xxvi; DOR, iii, 46-49; iv, 80.
72
Ibid., iii, 48; Wyclif's reference here is to Proverbs 1:7.
73 DCD, I, xxix-xxxv.
74
Ibid., I, xxxix, 212.20-23: "Unde, sicut titulus acquirendi non per se sufficit ... sed
oportetprecipuesuperadderetitulumcaritatis,sic indubienec successio hereditarianec popularis
eleccio per se sufficit."
75Ibid., I, xxx, 216.12-16: "Sic titulus dominandiex iure hereditarioChristi
per graciam
est prius naturaliteret essencialiter requisitum post lapsum ad hoc quod quis quomodolibet
dominetur."
71
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thethroneis to be theking'ssonthroughdiscipleshipin Christ,theentireclass
of the apostolicallypoorarepotentialaspirantsto the dutyof civil dominium;
andthe presentGrace-favored
kingis freeto makea carefulselectionamong
themostdeservingof these.
Wyclifbelievesthe civil institutionof servitude,in whichpeopleareborn
into subjectionto a lord,to be a realevil. In his view,just civil dominiumis
on behalfof thedivineLord,andnotmastery,andto supposethat
stewardship
other
thanone's havingbeen favoredby Gracecan determinejust
anything
dominiumis folly. Trueservitude,he argues,is subjectionto materialneeds;
servantsorsubjectswithcaritashavetrue,naturalmasteryovertheircivillords
when the lordsarein thrallof materialwealth.76
Likewise,truemasteryinvolvesanattitudeof love-foundedconcernforone'ssubjects,so Wyclifs pictureof justcivil dominiumallowsmorebenefitsto thesubjectthanto thelord.
Whena lordceasesto devotehis concernsto thoseof his subject,the mastery
relationends;thelordis no longera lord,andthesubjectno longersubject,and
no humanordinancecanpreventthisfromoccurring.77
As withtheinheritance
of civil dominiumin general,casesin whicha Grace-lesslordinheritstheservice of subjectscan neverbe just. Thus,Wyclifs reasoningservesto indict
relationnot characterized
everylord-subject
by a lovingreciprocityas having
no placein a just society.
De Civili
Wycliftakesa similarapproachregardingtyranny.Throughout
DominioandDe OfficioRegishe advisesthosesubjectto a tyrantto bearup
obedientlyunderwhatmightwell be God'scleansingscourge."FortheSavior
obeyedthecorporealbiddingof Herod,Pilate,andpriestlyrulers,whichotherwise he couldeasilyhaveresisted;all Christ'sactionsareourinstructions,
so
we shouldobeytyrants...."78
rather
for
allowreasons
God's
Wyclif's
terrifying
anceof earthlytyrannyarethattyrantsserveto punishthesin of abusingGod's
favor,to providedisciplineforthejust,andto instructthe faithfulthatno civil
officeoughtto be usedto attainGod'sfavor.79
Whiletheseadmittedlydissatisreasons
recur
on the natureof civil govdiscourse
fying
Wyclif's
throughout
ernment,theyarenot all thathe hasto say on thetopic.
of lordandsubjectas reciprocally
related
Implicitto Wyclifs redefinition
to one anotheris the notionthatthosewho servea lordhavea degreeof masin
teryovertheirlord.Whilethis ideais mostevidentin Wyclif'sarguments
favorof laymenreprovingtyrannous
priests,it holdstrueforseculartyrantsas
well. Servantswho knowthegoodbetterthantheirmasterscanrightfullydisobeyan evil command,he explains;in fact,whenfulfillingthe evil command
wouldbe unjust,the righteoussubject'sdutyis to refuseto obey or to disDCD, I, xxxiii, 234-37.
Ibid., I, xxxiv, 243.12-244.2. See also DOR, iv, 79.28-80.3.
78
DCD, I, xxviii, 199.9-14.
79 Ibid., I, vi, 42-46. See also DOR, i, 17.
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obey.80"If, throughthe absence of temporalcooperation[one] could destroy
the power and abuse of the tyrant,we should withdrawour cooperationfrom
him."8'Thereare even extremecases, Wyclif admits,wherethe service due the
especially heinous tyrantis his murder;but he suggests this moreto show how
differentare the types of service than to incite anyone to tyrannicide.82
Finally, Wyclif is wary of legislation and the courts. This does not mean
thathe distrustslaw, for all humanlaw thatimplementsdivine law is by definition just. But humanlaws thatonly complicatepeople's lives or providefor the
accumulationof wealth at the expense of othersare artificesthatdo not participate in the justice of God's law. Wyclif advises the just civil lord to avoid
makingtoo many laws, despite their apparentconvenience,for they contribute
more to confusion thanto order:"... such a multitudeof laws would be burdensome and useless in rule."83
One might expect Wyclif to endorsecreatingcivil laws thatenforce Christian practices. He distinguishesbetween just civil laws that implementdivine
justice and those that enforce Christiancaritas throughoutthe land, recognizing that one cannotexpect a law to compel one to do what Gracealone makes
possible. Ratherthan force people to give alms to the poor, for example, the
civil lord should take this duty on himself, for such a deed can really only be
possible for the caritas-infusedheart. While no civil court can rightfully enforce such charity,nor can it impede such acts.84
De OfficioRegis and De Civili Dominio contain many of the elements of
Wyclif's reformativeecclesiology, includinghis argumentsin favorof the complete divestmentof all feudal holdings from any priest, his belief that bishops
and popes must have absolutely no political power, his indictmentof the corruptionof the papaloffice, his argumentsfor the eliminationof excommunication as a means by which church-memberscan be controlled,and his wellknown belief that all Christiansmust have access to and understandingof the
Scriptures.We can only make passing reference to these ideas in our brief
sketch of the aspects of these first treatisesof his SummaTheologieindicating
Wyclif's progressivity.
Wyclif's political thought,with its foundationin the traditionalnotion of
the objective ius, is certainlynot comparableto Ockham'sor Marsilius's regardingthe rightsone might expect by virtueof being a human.But it would be
prematureto relegateit to the Museumof PhilosophicalCuriosities,for it shows
80

DOR, iv, 82.
I, xxviii, 201.30-33: "Verumtamen,si esset versimile homini per subtracciones
temporalis iuvaminis destruere potentatus tyrannidem vel abusum, debet ea intencione
subtrahere."
82
DOR, viii, 201.15-19.
83
Ibid., iii, 56.5-18.
84
DCD, III, xvi, 303.
81 DCD,
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a tendencytowardsthekindofprogressivity
thatcharacterizes
politicalthought
relianton subjectiveright.It wouldbe betterto concludethattheabsenceof a
theoryof subjectiverightin a medievalpoliticalthinkerdoes not necessarily
indicatean approachaverseto the modemway;in Wyclif'scase, a theoryof
objectiveius providesa foundationfora startlingly
atypicalmedievalpolitical
vision.
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